Key takeaways
The Court has reaffirmed the definition of an 'accident' as set out in Paul
It will only be in rare medical negligence cases where secondary victim claims will succeed.
The decision in Paul does not preclude a secondary victim from ever succeeding in a claim arising out of medical negligence
However this is rare.
MIM’s claim was struck out following the conclusion that MIM did not witness an accident
As such there was no legally recognisable claim.
MIM -v- Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2026] EWHC 562 (KB)
MIM comes as one of the first reported cases relating to a secondary victim claim since the Supreme Court decision in Paul -v- Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2024] UKSC 1. The Court has reaffirmed the definition of an 'accident' as set out in Paul and reinforces that it will only be in rare medical negligence cases where secondary victim claims will succeed.
Recap: the judgment in Paul
The Supreme Court held that secondary victims cannot claim damages for psychiatric harm caused by witnessing a loved one’s death or injury resulting from medical negligence, unless they are able to demonstrate that they witnessed an 'accident'.
An accident in these circumstances is described as 'an unexpected, unintended, and discrete event causing injury through violent external means.' However, as per the judgment, a death or illness caused by medical negligence is 'generally not an accident,' and would be referred to as a 'medical crisis'.
The facts in MIM
MIM attended the birth of his son where his wife had been admitted for an induction of labour. His son was born in poor condition, requiring resuscitation and subsequent therapeutic cooling and sadly suffered an acute profound hypoxic brain injury.
Breach of duty was admitted in relation to the management of the delivery and it was accepted that the baby ought to have been born sooner and that, with earlier delivery, he would have avoided all injury.
MIM brought a claim for psychiatric injury as a secondary victim, having witnessed the labour and delivery.
The Defendant applied to strike out the claim as lacking merit, in the light of Paul.
The decision in MIM
Her Honour Judge Evans held that:
The ordinary person would not say MIM witnessed an accident: they would say he witnessed the process of labour and the birth of his son in an injured condition, which is a description of a negligently caused medical crisis, rather than an accident.
No discrete event: Claimant Counsel’s submissions suggested the opposite of this. He argued the 'accident' was a continuum, from the midwives appearing not to know what was happening, to the alarm sounding repeatedly, and all culminating in the delivery.
Not unexpected or unintended: The events said to have caused the psychiatric injury, e.g. the sounding of the alarm on the monitor, were neither unexpected nor unintended in the context of the labour, and whilst they were a manifestation of the injury to the child, they were not the cause. The injury to the child arose as a result of the period of hypoxia that itself arose during the bodily process of labour and birth due to failure to expedite delivery.
MIM’s claim was struck out following the conclusion that MIM did not witness an accident and as such there was no legally recognisable claim.
Future implications of MIM
The issue as to whether the events witnessed by a potential secondary victim will amount to an accident as opposed to a medical crisis is one that will be decided on the facts of each individual case.
The decision in Paul does not preclude a secondary victim from ever succeeding in a claim arising out of medical negligence. However, the decision in MIM reinforces Lord Burrows’ dissenting judgment in Paul in that it will only be in rare cases that such a claim will succeed.
This article was co-authored by Paralegal, Lauren McCarthy.
