Key takeaways
Breach of arbitration agreement
This can result in anti-suit and/or anti-enforcement injunctions from tribunals and the Court.
Court order to support tribunal’s peremptory order
This may be obtained under s.42 Arbitration Act 1996, including where the tribunal orders anti-suit or anti-enforcement relief.
Autonomy of arbitration
The Court will not step in unless and until all available arbitral processes have been exhausted.
Tecnimont S.P.A. & another -v- LLC Eurochem North-West-2 (Russia) [2026] EWHC 255 (Comm)
In an earlier article (Court of Appeal finds anti-suit injunction vital for arbitration | Hill Dickinson), we reported on a Court of Appeal decision that reaffirmed the English Court’s power under s.42 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (1996 Act) to enforce the peremptory orders (POs) of an arbitral tribunal. The POs in question were issued by an ICC arbitral tribunal and one of them granted anti-suit relief restraining Russian Arbitrazh Court proceedings brought in breach of the ICC arbitration agreement.
In this latest decision, the Commercial Court has made a second s.42 order supporting an anti-enforcement injunction granted by the Tribunal in a further PO. However, it declined to grant an application to order anti-enforcement relief pursuant to s.37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (SCA 1981). The Court made clear that its general discretionary powers to order injunctive relief under s.37 should not be exercised where to do so would go against the arbitration regime set out in the 1996 Act.
The background facts
In brief, ICC arbitration proceedings were commenced by the claimants, Tecnimont SpA and MT Russia LLC, in London in August 2022 under three contracts to build a urea and ammonia fertiliser plant in Russia. The claimants subsequently contended they were unable to perform the contracts, due to the imposition of UK and EU sanctions against Mr Melnichenko, a designated individual and the controller of the defendant company, LLC Eurochem North-West-2 (NW-2), and suspended them. NW-2 denied the validity of the claimants’ suspended performance and terminated the contracts.
NW-2 counterclaimed in the ICC arbitration for damages for breach of contract. NW-2 also brought proceedings in the Commercial Court against the banks who had issued performance bonds in support of the contracts. In July 2025, judgment was handed down at first instance, holding that the bonds were unenforceable by reason of the EU sanctions regime.
Following the judgment in the proceedings relating to the performance bonds, NW-2 brought proceedings in Russia. Primarily:
Proceedings against the claimants for breach of contract to recover the amount counterclaimed in the ICC arbitration. The Moscow Arbitrazh Court gave judgment in NW-2’s favour in the amount of approximately US$2.19 billion on 27 November 2025 (November Russian judgment).
Two sets of proceedings seeking injunctive relief to stop the ICC arbitration proceedings (anti-arbitration proceedings). These applications were granted by the St Petersburg Arbitrazh Court on 10 December 2025.
Interim measures were also ordered by the Russian Court on 30 October 2025 comprising the seizure of moveable funds and property to a value of approximately €103 million referred to as the 'interim measures orders'.
The ICC Tribunal ordered NW-2 to withdraw the Russian proceedings. In particular, PO 18 contained a peremptory order that NW-2 should withdraw the second Russian proceedings and the anti-arbitration proceedings. PO 22 contained a peremptory order to take all steps necessary or appropriate for the discharge of the interim measures order. PO 23 contained a further peremptory order to withdraw the second Russian proceedings.
The Commercial Court subsequently granted an order, pursuant to s.42 of the 1996 Act, supporting the Tribunal’s POs. An appeal against this order to the Court of Appeal was dismissed.
Subsequent events
NW-2 did not comply with the Tribunal’s POs, nor with the court order supporting the POs. Instead, NW-2 progressed the Russian court proceedings and the Russian courts made orders in both the second Russian proceedings and the anti-arbitration proceedings.
On 9 December 2025 the Tribunal, by PO 25, granted an application to restrain NW-2 from seeking to enforce the November Russian court judgment and any other judgments or orders that it might obtain in breach of the parties' arbitration agreements.
Regardless, in December 2025, NW-2 took steps in India to enforce the Russian judgment and to freeze assets pending enforcement. It also applied for a writ of execution to enforce the penalties ordered in the Russian anti-arbitration order. The Russian Court granted that relief on 26 December 2025. In January 2025, NW-2 brought proceedings in Malaysia seeking an interim freezing order pending enforcement of the November Russian judgment.
Application for anti-enforcement injunction
The claimants obtained the Tribunal’s permission to seek further relief under s.42 of the 1996 Act (PO 28). Among other things, PO 28 ordered NW-2 to withdraw the enforcement proceedings and to comply with PO 25.
The claimants applied to the Court for an order to support PO 25 and PO 28.
However, the claimants also sought, in the alternative, an order from the Court under s.37 of the SCA 1981, which deals with the Court’s general discretionary power to grant injunctive relief if it is just and convenient to do so.
The Court had to consider the relationship between s.42 of the 1996 Act and s.37 of the SCA 1981 and to decide whether to grant relief under one or both provisions.
The Commercial Court decision
The Court of Appeal had held that an anti-suit injunction was in furtherance of the ICC arbitration and therefore within the scope of s.42. On that basis, the Court here decided that an anti-enforcement injunction to prohibit proceedings to enforce an order obtained in breach of an anti-suit injunction would also be within the scope of s.42.
The Court also thought it would be appropriate to grant the anti-enforcement injunction in circumstances where NW-2 continued to pursue foreign court proceedings in breach of English arbitration agreements and court orders. The need to support the arbitration outweighed any concerns that NW-2’s directors could be liable for civil or criminal sanctions in Russia (an argument which had been dismissed by the Court that had granted the initial s.42 order).
The Court did not, however, think that it should grant an order under s.37 of the SCA 1981 even though it had a discretion to do so. The claimants had argued that such an order was necessary because PO 28 was not as wide as it could have been. Therefore, a s.37 order would prohibit any future proceedings that may be initiated in breach of PO 25 and would relieve the claimants from having to revert to the Tribunal to obtain further POs going forward, which would result in delay.
However, the Court made clear that, pursuant to s.42(3) of the 1996 Act, the Court should not exercise its powers under s.42 unless it was satisfied that the applicant had exhausted any available arbitral process in respect of any failure to comply with the Tribunal’s orders. The primary recourse was intended to be to the Tribunal. The Court distinguished a previous authority in which the Court had granted an anti-enforcement injunction under s.37 where it was alleged that Russian court proceedings had been commenced in breach of an arbitration agreement. In that case, no arbitral tribunal had been constituted, and no peremptory orders had been made.
The fact that any PO issued by the Tribunal was not as broad as it might have been, was a matter between the Tribunal and the parties.
Therefore, the Court did not grant a s.37 order to support the first s.42 order. The claimants had a remedy; they could bring proceedings for contempt for breach of that order. The Court could see no detriment to the claimants in this case which justified the exercise of the Court's discretion under s.37 in a way which would cut across the clear language and structure of the 1996 Act.
Comment
The Court has made clear that where relief is obtainable from an arbitral tribunal, then that avenue must first be exhausted before any application is made to the Court. This approach reflects the Court’s traditional approach of not interfering with arbitration proceedings unless it is just and convenient to do so.
And it remains important to consider carefully the scope and extent of any order sought and obtained from a tribunal to avoid having to go back for further orders.
