The Longchamp: ransom negotiations and Rule F of the York Antwerp Rules

Article16.11.20267 mins read

Key takeaways

Substituted expenses under Rule F

Not confined to expenditure incurred through an entirely different course of action.

Expenditure reducing or avoiding GA expense

May be recoverable under Rule F where genuinely incurred substitution for allowable GA expense.

Reasonable of expense saved

Rule F can apply where full amount of expense saved would have been disallowed as unreasonable under Rule A.

In the Longchamp, the majority of the Supreme Court adopted a broader and more commercially flexible interpretation of substituted expenses under Rule F of the York Antwerp Rules (YAR), representing a significant development in English law on general average (GA).

The background: piracy and ransom negotiations

In 2009, the LONGCHAMP was hijacked by Somali pirates while transiting the Gulf of Aden. The pirates initially demanded a ransom of US$6 million for the release of the vessel, its cargo and crew. Negotiations ensued, lasting approximately 51 days, following which the pirates accepted a reduced ransom of US$1.85 million.

During the negotiations, the shipowners continued to incur vessel-operating expenses, including crew wages, high-risk area bonuses and the cost of bunkers consumed while the vessel remained detained. These expenses amounted to US$160,213.95. The ransom payment itself was accepted as allowable in GA under Rule A of the YAR. However, a dispute arose as to whether the additional operating expenses incurred during the negotiations were also recoverable.

The shipowners argued that those expenses had been incurred in substitution for the additional ransom expenditure avoided through negotiation and were therefore allowable under Rule F.

Cargo interests disagreed, contending that the expenses were ordinary consequences of the detention and did not constitute substituted expenses within the meaning of Rule F. The dispute ultimately reached the Supreme Court.

Rule F: the principle of substituted expenses

GA is founded on the principle that extraordinary sacrifices or expenditure reasonably incurred for the common safety of a maritime adventure should be shared proportionately among the interests benefiting from that expenditure.

Rule A of the YAR sets out the fundamental requirements of a GA act, including that the sacrifice or expenditure must be extraordinary, intentional and reasonable, and undertaken for the common safety.

Rule C limits recovery to losses, damages or expenses directly resulting from a GA act and excludes losses arising from delay, including indirect losses.

Rule F, however, addresses a different category of expenditure: expenses incurred in substitution for expenditure that would otherwise have been allowable in GA.

Under Rule F of YAR 1974, an extra expense incurred in place of another expense that would have been allowable in GA is itself deemed to be GA, subject to a limit equivalent to the amount of GA expenditure avoided. Examples include; performing temporary repairs, working overtime or transhipping cargo and forwarding to destination onto other vessels.

Whereas Rule A concerns expenditure incurred directly for the common safety, Rule F recognises that parties may incur additional expenditure to avoid or reduce another expense that would qualify for GA.

The question in this case was therefore not whether crew wages and bunkers incurred during detention qualified independently under Rule A, but whether they could be recovered because they had been incurred in substitution for a greater allowable expense.

The decisions below: a narrower approach

The Commercial Court held that the negotiation-period expenses were recoverable under Rule F. The Court thought that the expenses were incurred in place of the additional ransom expenditure avoided and that Rule F did not require the substituted expenditure to arise from an entirely different type of action.

The Court of Appeal disagreed and concluded that Rule F required a genuine alternative course of action to the course that would otherwise have resulted in allowable GA expenditure. On that approach, negotiating a lower ransom did not constitute an alternative to paying a ransom. Rather, negotiation was an ordinary part of the process through which a ransom would be agreed.

The Court of Appeal therefore considered that the additional vessel-operating expenses were not incurred in substitution for another allowable expense. Its interpretation reflected a more restrictive understanding of substituted expenditure, traditionally associated with situations where one method of dealing with a maritime casualty is replaced by another.

The Owners appealed.

The Supreme Court: a broader interpretation of Rule F

The Supreme Court, by a majority, rejected the proposition that Rule F required shipowners to demonstrate that they had adopted an entirely different course of action. Instead, the Supreme Court focused on the ordinary meaning of the words used in Rule F.

1. An alternative course of action is not essential

The requirement for one expense to be incurred in place of another should be assessed objectively. The negotiations had taken time, and that passage of time resulted in additional vessel-operating expenses being incurred.

Those negotiations had also produced a substantial reduction in the ransom ultimately paid. There was therefore a sufficient relationship between the expenditure incurred during the negotiations and the additional ransom expenditure avoided.

Rule F did not require the substituted expenditure to arise from an unusual or fundamentally different response to the casualty. Rule F could, therefore, apply where expenditure was incurred to reduce an allowable expense, rather than necessarily replacing it with expenditure of a different nature.

2. The hypothetical expense need not be reasonable in its full amount

For these purposes, it was not relevant whether the avoided US$6 million would have been allowable under Rule A or would have been disallowed because it was unreasonable.

Rule F only requires that the expense avoided be of a type that could give rise to GA. A ransom payment to secure the release of a vessel and cargo is clearly the kind of expenditure that could potentially fall within GA. The precise amount demanded was a separate question. In any event, the Rule F wording already limits recovery to a sum not exceeding the amount saved.

On the facts, the amount claimed of just over US$160,000 claimed was substantially below the additional ransom expenditure avoided. The majority therefore concluded that the expenses were recoverable under Rule F.

3. Rule C does not prevent recovery under Rule F

Rule C excludes losses arising from delay, including certain indirect losses. Ordinarily, the costs of maintaining a vessel during detention would face difficulties under Rule C, unless independently allowable under a specific rule.

However, the Supreme Court distinguished expenditure claimed as a direct consequence of a GA act from expenditure incurred in substitution for an allowable GA expense. Rule F operates independently in this respect.

An expense that is excluded from direct recovery under Rule C may nevertheless be recoverable under Rule F where it satisfies the requirements for substituted expenditure. Rule F permits expenditure which is not itself allowable as ordinary GA expenditure to be admitted where it has successfully mitigated expenditure that would otherwise have been allowable.

The distinction does not render Rule C redundant. Rather, the two provisions address different categories of expenditure. Rule C governs the ordinary admissibility of consequential losses and expenses, whereas Rule F provides a separate basis for recovering qualifying substituted expenditure.

Comment

The dissenting Lord Justice expressed concern that Rule F should not become a mechanism for recovering expenses that would otherwise be excluded by the YAR. This view reflects the tension between encouraging the mitigation of GA expenditure and preserving the boundaries of recoverability under the YAR.

However, the significance of the majority decision lies not in making all mitigation expenses recoverable, but in clarifying the circumstances in which expenditure can properly be characterised as substituted.

The limits remain important and the GA claimant must demonstrate a genuine substitution, identify the otherwise allowable GA expenditure avoided and establish the amount recoverable within Rule F’s express cap.

For shipowners, cargo interests and insurers, the decision continues to shape the allocation of casualty-related expenses and the scrutiny applied to GA adjustments.

Ultimately, as this case highlights, the aim of GA is to encourage expenditure that preserves the common maritime adventure while ensuring that the resulting financial burden is distributed only where the governing Rules permit.

Cassandra Anum is an Associate Member of the Association of Average Adjusters.

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