When the Court says "too late": emergency relief in arbitrations

BLL v STI [2026] EWHC 1678 (TCC) (03 July 2026)

This decision provides a useful reminder of the limited circumstances in which the English courts will grant urgent interim relief in support of arbitration proceedings.

The case arose from a dispute concerning a software development arrangement, a subsequent cyber incident and the proposed withdrawal of support services for a business-critical technology platform.

The Technology and Construction Court ultimately refused the claimant's application for wide-ranging mandatory injunctions under s.44 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (1996 Act), which sets out the powers that the Court can exercise in support of arbitral proceedings.

While the facts were technology-specific, the judgment contains broader lessons for parties seeking emergency relief in disputes that are subject to arbitration agreements.

The background facts

BLL operated an online gift-card platform originally developed under a software development agreement containing a London arbitration clause.

Following a cyber incident in February 2026, BLL sought access to technical information, logs, source code and infrastructure-related materials from STI, the Canadian company then providing hosting and support services.

The relationship subsequently deteriorated. STI notified BLL that it intended to cease providing support and to decommission the platform.

BLL applied to the Court under s.44 of the 1996 Act for a series of mandatory orders, including:

1. continuation of platform access and support services

2. preservation of technical materials and data

3. disclosure of technical architecture information

4. provision of platform administration access and

5. disclosure of cyber incident investigation materials.

The Court decision

The application was dismissed.

S.44 remains a limited jurisdiction

The judgment reinforces the principle that s.44 of the 1996 Act is intended to support arbitration, not to provide an alternative forum for interim dispute resolution.

The Court emphasised that, in cases of urgency, relief under s.44(3) is available only where it is necessary for the preservation of evidence or assets and where the arbitral process cannot act effectively in time.

Parties should, therefore, be cautious about assuming that the Court will readily intervene simply because a dispute relates to a business-critical technology system or operational emergency.

Delay may undermine claims of urgency

A notable feature of the decision was the Court's treatment of urgency.

The Court observed that STI's intention to withdraw support had been communicated months before the application was made. During that period, BLL had not commenced arbitration proceedings or taken steps to appoint an arbitrator. The Court concluded that any urgency had been materially contributed to by BLL's own failure to pursue the contractual dispute resolution mechanism.

The decision highlights an important practical point: parties seeking emergency court assistance should act promptly to commence arbitration. Delay may make it more difficult to establish that court intervention is genuinely necessary.

Mandatory injunctions face a high threshold

The Court also reiterated the well-established principle that mandatory injunctions are granted only in exceptional circumstances. An applicant must generally demonstrate a high degree of assurance that it will ultimately succeed on the merits.

That threshold was not met in this case because there were significant disputes regarding:

1. whether STI had become bound by the original development agreement

2. whether obligations relating to support services remained operative and

3. the extent of any ongoing contractual obligations owed to BLL.

The Court was unwilling to grant relief that would effectively determine issues that were properly for an arbitral tribunal to decide.

Technology disputes present particular difficulties

The judgment also illustrates the practical challenges associated with mandatory relief in technology disputes.

Several of the orders sought would have required STI to continue operating and supporting a complex technology environment and to provide extensive technical assistance. The Court expressed concern about the breadth and vagueness of some of the obligations relied upon and the practical difficulties involved in supervising compliance with such orders.

For suppliers and customers alike, this serves as a reminder that courts are often reluctant to compel parties to continue complex technical relationships on an interim basis, particularly where the underlying contractual rights are disputed.

The dispute also highlights several drafting points that may warrant consideration in technology and managed services arrangements:

1. clear provisions governing access to logs and forensic information following a cyber incident

2. detailed exit management and transition assistance obligations

3. rights relating to source code, escrow arrangements and technical documentation

4. express obligations concerning preservation of information and operational records and

5. clearly defined notice provisions for termination of hosting or support services.

Where a customer's business is heavily dependent on a third-party technology platform, these provisions may become critical in a distress scenario.

Comment

This case demonstrates that the English courts will continue to take a cautious approach to s.44 applications, particularly where mandatory relief is sought.

Parties to arbitration agreements should not assume that a business-critical technology dispute will justify court intervention. Prompt commencement of arbitration proceedings, together with carefully drafted contractual protections, remains the best means of mitigating operational risk when disputes arise.

For more information on how our International Arbitration experts can support you, contact us today.

This article was co-authored by Trainee Solicitor, Rayona Basu.