Worker status: volunteers can be workers when paid for activities

In a key decision of relevance to any organisation relying on volunteers, the Court of Appeal has held that volunteers can be workers when they are entitled to be paid remuneration for performing activities related to their volunteer position.

Legal background

Identifying whether an individual is an ‘employee’ or ‘worker’ is important for establishing which employment rights apply to them. For an individual to be an ‘employee’, both parties must be under an irreducible minimum of obligation to provide and accept work, in exchange for remuneration. Alternatively, an individual is a ‘worker’ when they are either: (a) an employee; or (b) they personally perform work, in exchange for remuneration, and are not in business on their own account.

Many organisations, including charities and voluntary bodies, rely heavily on the assistance of ‘volunteers’ and there can sometimes be a degree of uncertainty around their employment status. The EAT has previously held that volunteers, who are not obliged to be offered / accept work, and who only receive the reimbursement of expenses actually incurred, will not be an ‘employee’ (Melhuish -v- Redbridge Citizens Advice Bureau [2005] IRLR 419). It is only if the work is regular, and the expenses payments are in reality in excess of the expenses incurred so in reality they are a payment for work, that a volunteer may be an employee (Migrant Advisory Service -v- Chaudri [1998] EAT 1400_97_2807).

In a key decision of relevance to any organisation relying on volunteers, the Court of Appeal has recently considered whether volunteers can fall within the ‘worker’ definition when they are entitled to be paid for performing certain activities relating to their voluntary position.

Factual background

G volunteered for around 35 years with the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) as a volunteer coastguard rescue officer. The relevant documentation governing the relationship included:

• A volunteer handbook, which described the relationship as “a two-way commitment” and confirmed that “no contract of employment exists”;

• A code of conduct, which required volunteer rescue officers to maintain their competence by regularly attending training, and to “maintain a reasonable level of incident attendance”;

• A remuneration document, under which volunteer rescue officers could choose to claim payments for carrying out certain activities to cover the “minor costs caused by your volunteering, and to compensate for any disruption to your personal life and employment and for unsocial hours call outs”, although many volunteer rescue officers chose not to claim these payments;

• Pay documentation for those volunteer rescue officers who chose to claim under the remuneration document, including payslips itemising the hourly remuneration and expenses they had received and annual P60s.

G’s position as a volunteer rescue officer was eventually terminated following a disciplinary hearing. Thereafter, among other things, G claimed that the MCA had breached his right to be accompanied at a disciplinary meeting. This claim depended on him establishing that he had ‘worker’ status.

At a preliminary hearing, the employment tribunal held that G was not a ‘worker’ because there was no contract between him and the MCA in relation to the individual activities he performed. G successfully appealed to the EAT, which substituted a decision that G was a ‘worker’ when he attended activities in respect of which he was entitled to remuneration. The MCA appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Court of Appeal decision

The Court of Appeal dismissed the MCA’s appeal and upheld the EAT’s decision that G had ‘worker’ status when he was undertaking activities relating to his position as a coastguard rescue officer for which he was entitled to be paid.

There was enough evidence of an intention to create legal relations between the parties and sufficient mutuality of obligation between them. Although CRO’s were not obliged to attend on any particular occasion, previous Supreme Court decisions had made it clear that the fact an individual is not obliged to attend for work on a given occasion is not a bar to ‘worker’ status. There might be sufficient mutuality of obligation between the parties even if that obligation only subsists during the period that the individual carries out paid work. Therefore, although CRO’s have the freedom to accept / reject work, and can limit the time they spend on MCA activities, this did not mean they were not ‘workers’ when they did respond and attend activities related to their voluntary positions. The documentation also made it clear that they were bound to obey the MCA’s reasonable instructions when they did attend incidents or training.

Further, attendance for most activities rendered the officer entitled, although not compelled, to claim remuneration. These payments were described by the MCA’s own document as ‘compensation for any disruption to your personal life and employment’. The Court of Appeal upheld the EAT’s decision that payment in compensation for interference with a person's use of their free time is “the essence of remuneration”.

Therefore, on each occasion when G answered the call from the MCA to turn out to perform voluntary duties/activities, for which he was entitled to claim payment under the remuneration document, he was doing so as a ‘worker’.

Practical implications of the decision

Charities, sporting bodies and other organisations that rely on volunteers should review their contractual documentation with those volunteers. They should also carefully examine any payments (however they are expressed) they make to these ‘volunteers’ to compensate them for the interference their leisure time.

Whilst in this case the main focus was on G’s entitlement to be accompanied during a disciplinary process, it should be remembered that ‘worker’ status will also attract other employment rights, including to receive national minimum wage and an entitlement to paid annual leave.

Correctly determining an individual’s status will increase in importance soon, with the creation of the new Fair Work Agency (FWA) in April 2026, because this will have extensive powers to take enforcement action against non-compliant employers. For further information about the FWA and its new powers, see our tracker: What does the Employment Rights Act 2025 contain? | Hill Dickinson.

Maritime and Coastguard Agency -v- Groom [2026] EWCA Civ 6